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College women experience rape and sexual assault at alarmingly 
high rates.1 One highly publicized statistic, famously asserted by 
President Obama,2 states that one in five women experience sexual 
assault while attending college.3 In 2011, the U.S. Department of 
Education radically expanded its involvement in campus sexual 
misconduct adjudications, encouraging vigorous enforcement. 
Sustained regulatory and public pressure effectuated some positive 
change for victims.4 However, a proliferation of litigation also followed. 
Students found responsible of campus sexual assault, most of whom 
were males, increasingly began suing their schools alleging due process 
violations in their adjudications.5 In 2018, the Trump administration’s 
Department of Education proposed a new rule (the “Proposed Rule”), 
in part to strengthen what it perceived as procedural deficiencies in the 
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 1. Campus Sexual Violence Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, 
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/cam pus-sexual-violence. 
 2. President Barack Obama & Vice President Joseph Biden, Remarks by the President and 
Vice President at an Event for the Council on Women and Girls (Jan. 22, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/22/remarks-president-and-vice-
president-event-council-women-and-girls. 
 3. See, e.g., Christopher Krebs et al, Campus Sexual Assault Study, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE 5-3 (Dec. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf 
(“Overall, 19% of undergraduate women reported experiencing attempted or completing sexual 
assault since entering college.”); see also Christopher Krebs et al, Campus Climate Survey 
Validation Study Final Technical Report, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., DEP’T OF JUSTICE 73 (Jan. 
2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ccsvsftr.pdf (“The prevalence rate for completed 
sexual assault since entering college among the female sample . . . [was an] average rate of 21%.”).  
 4. Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 12, 2015), 
https://prospect.org/justice/sex-lies-justice/. 
 5. Greta Anderson, More Title IX Lawsuits by Accusers and Accused, INSIDE HIGHER 
EDUC. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/10/03/students-look-federal-
courts-challenge-title-ix-proceedings. 
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regulatory landscape established by the previous administration.6 This 
Note analyzes the extent to which the Proposed Rule brings the scales 
back to equipoise by strengthening the due process rights for the 
accused, and where the Proposed Rule falls short of sufficiently 
supporting the victims. The Proposed Rule appropriately affords basic 
due process rights that were either explicitly or implicitly lacking under 
the old regime, but in some instances the Proposed Rule overreaches 
at the expense of the victims. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Education (“DOE”) utilizes Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 to address student-on-student sexual 
misconduct at recipient schools.7 Although Title IX is now inexorably 
linked to campus sexual misconduct, Title IX and related DOE 
regulations initially focused on ensuring that schools themselves did 
not discriminate based on sex.8 Title IX “prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of sex in any federally funded education program or activity.”9 
It authorizes DOE to promulgate rules and terminate federal funds of 
recipient schools out of compliance with those rules.10 Under the first 
regulations promulgated by DOE, which are still in force today, 
recipient schools must: (1) adopt, publish, and distribute a policy stating 
that the school does not discriminate based on sex,11 (2) designate at 
 
 6. Secretary DeVos: Proposed Title IX Rule Provides Clarity for Schools, Support for 
Survivors, and Due Process for All, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/ 
news/press-releases/secretary-devos-proposed-title-ix-rule-provides-clarity-schools-support-
survivors-and-due-process-rights-all. 
 7. Throughout this Note, “recipient schools” or “schools” refers to postsecondary 
educational institutions that receive federal financial assistance for educational programs or 
activities from the U.S. Department of Education. 
 8. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (2019) (describing the purpose of the regulations effectuating Title IX 
as eliminating sex discrimination in educational programs); 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (2019) (requiring 
schools develop grievance procedures to resolve complaints of sex discrimination by the schools 
themselves); Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 898 
(2016) (explaining that the current view of Title IX as addressing student-on-student sexual 
misconduct “was alien at the time of enactment”).  
 9. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
 10. See id. § 1682 (“Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend 
Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to 
effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of 
general applicability . . . . Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may 
be effected . . . by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such 
program or activity to any recipient.”); see also Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. (Apr. 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html.  
 11. 34 C.F.R. § 106.9(a)–(c). 
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least one employee to serve as a Title IX Coordinator,12 and (3) create 
and publish grievance procedures “providing for prompt and equitable 
resolution” of sex discrimination.13 The Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) 
within DOE enforces Title IX by investigating and resolving 
complaints of sex discrimination and conducting institution-level 
compliance reviews.14 The Supreme Court has also recognized a federal 
private right of action for victims of sex discrimination by recipient 
schools.15 
After the promulgation of the 1975 regulations, the Supreme Court 
clarified recipient schools’ obligations to address sexual harassment as 
a form of sex discrimination. In 1992, the Court found that Title IX 
applied to employee-on-student sexual harassment16 when the school 
had “actual knowledge” of the harassment and responded with 
“deliberate indifference.”17 In 1999, the Court extended these holdings 
to student-on-student sexual harassment, holding that a school can be 
liable if it “acts with deliberate indifference to the known acts of 
harassment in its programs or activities” but “only for harassment that 
is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars 
the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”18 OCR 
guidance in 1997 and 2001 began to address sexual harassment as a 
form of sex discrimination, focusing on schools’ obligations to ensure 
the schools themselves do not commit or perpetuate sex 
discrimination.19 In 1997, OCR determined that schools create a 
 
 12. Id. § 106.8(a). 
 13. Id. § 106.8(b). 
 14. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2015), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html.  
 15. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703, 717 (1979) (“We have no doubt that Congress 
intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it 
understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited 
discrimination.”).   
 16. See Franklin v. Gwinnet Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (granting remedy to 
student harmed by an employee’s sexual harassment).  
 17. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1992).  
 18. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 633, 633 (1999). 
 19. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other 
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,040 (Mar. 13, 1997) [hereinafter “1997 
Guidance”] (“Thus, Title IX does not make a school responsible for the actions of harassing 
students, but rather for its own discrimination in failing to remedy it once the school has notice.”); 
see also Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by 
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 12 (Jan. 19, 2001), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [hereinafter “2001 Guidance”] 
(notice of publication being located at 66 Fed. Reg. 5512) (“[A]s long as the school, upon notice 
of the harassment, responds by taking prompt and effective action to end the harassment and 
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“hostile environment” by failing to address sexual harassment.20 Once 
remedied, schools sufficiently complied with Title IX.21 In 2001, OCR 
clarified how to remedy such a hostile environment and established six 
factors it would consider when investigating schools’ grievance 
procedures to determine whether they comport with a “prompt and 
equitable resolution”  for incidents of sex discrimination.22 
In 2011, OCR fundamentally shifted its enforcement of Title IX.23 
OCR issued a “Dear Colleague Letter,” (“DCL”) establishing specific 
procedural requirements that recipient schools must utilize to remedy 
student-on-student sexual harassment.24 The DCL was later 
supplemented by a 2014 guidance document.25 The DCL introduced 
“sexual violence” as a type of harassment covered under Title IX, 
mandated a preponderance of the evidence standard for sexual 
misconduct adjudications, declined to require live hearings, and 
expressed a strong disapproval of the use of cross-examination.26 While 
the DCL facially provided claimants and respondents equal rights 
throughout the process,27 it was widely perceived by judges and legal 
commentators as promoting the rights of victims at the expense of the 
accused.28 The DCL dedicated two sentences of the nineteen-page 
 
prevent its recurrence, the school has carried out its responsibility under the Title IX 
Regulations.”). 
 20. 1997 Guidance, supra note 19, at 12,039.  
 21. Id. at 12,039–40. 
 22. 2001 Guidance, supra note 19, at 20 (the notice of publication is located at 66 Fed. Reg. 
5512) (“[1] Notice . . . of the procedure, including where complaints may be filed; [2] Application 
of the procdure to complaints . . .; [3] Adequate, reliable, and impartial investigations of 
complaints, including the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence; [4] Designated 
and reasonably prompt timeframes for the major stages of the complaint process; [5] Notice to 
the parties of the outcome of the complaint; and [6] An assurance that the school will take steps 
to prevent recurrence of any harassment and to correct its discriminatory effects on the 
complainant and others, if appropriate.”). 
 23. Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 901 (2016). 
The authors suggest that through the DCL, OCR signaled to schools that their grievance 
procedures would now be subject to governmental oversight, whereas previously OCR “simply” 
monitored whether schools themselves were engaging in sex discrimination. Id. at 902. 
 24. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
to Colleague (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201104.pdf [hereinafter “Dear Colleague Letter”]. 
 25. Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 29, 
2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf. 
 26. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 1, 10–12. 
 27. See id. at 11 (providing both parties with an equal opportunity to present relevant 
witnesses and other evidence).  
 28. See, e.g., Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 779 (5th Cir. 2017) (Jones, J., 
dissenting) (“[The OCR] procedures prescribed for adjudication of sexual misconduct are heavily 
weighted in favor of finding guilt.”); see also Task Force on the Response of Universities and 
Colleges to Allegations of Sexual Violence, White Paper on Campus Sexual Assault Investigations, 
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guidance to the procedural protections schools should afford accused 
students: 
Public and state-supported schools must provide due process to the 
alleged perpetrator. However, schools should ensure that steps 
taken to accord due process rights to the alleged perpetrator do not 
restrict or unnecessarily delay the Title IX protections of the 
complainant.29 
OCR vigorously enforced the DCL.30 It published and regularly 
updated a list of schools under investigation;31 by 2018, OCR had 305 
active investigations.32 Fearing financial repercussions,33 schools 
“scrambled” to comply and “stave off or resolve OCR investigations.”34 
Many schools modified their grievance procedures in ways that made 
sexual misconduct cases easier to resolve. For example, some schools 
removed protections previously afforded to accused students;35 others 
lowered the burden to preponderance of the evidence for sexual 
misconduct cases while retaining higher burdens for other types of 
misconduct.36 When Harvard changed its policies in 2011, a group of 
 
AM. C. OF TRIAL LAW. 19 (Mar. 2017), https://www.actl.com/docs/default-source/default-
document-library/position-statements-and-white-papers/task_force_allegations_of_sexual_ 
violence_white_paper_final.pdf (“Concerns of withdrawal of federal funding combined with 
media attention surrounding campus sexual assault, may cause universities—consciously or not—
to err on the side of protecting or validating the complainant at the expense of the accused.”). 
 29. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 12. This characterization is not entirely accurate, 
see discussion infra Section III. 
 30. U.S. Department of Education Releases List of Higher Education Institutions with Open 
Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (May 1, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/ 
news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-highereducation-institutions-open-
title-i (“[Recipients that] violate the law and refuse the address the problems identified by OCR 
can lose federal funding or be referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for further action.”). 
 31. Id.; Nick DeSantis, Education Dept. Stops Providing Details on Resolved Title IX Cases, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Education-Dept-
Stops/242831//.  
 32. Title IX Tracker, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (last updated Mar. 15, 2018), 
http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/. The Chronicle of Higher Education aggregated data on 
open and resolved OCR Title IX investigations up until March 15, 2018 when OCR announced it 
would stop providing information on its Title IX cases. Id.  
 33. Doe v. Purdue, 928 F.3d 652, 668 (7th Cir. 2019); Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment 
Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-
harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html. 
 34. Gersen & Suk, supra note 23, at 902. 
 35. See, e.g., Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 578 (D. Mass. 2016) (noting that 
from 2011–12 manual to the 2013–14 manual, the school made “significant revisions to the 
process . . . with even fewer protections to the accused”); Doe v. Wash. and Lee Univ., No. 6: 14-
CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *9 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015) (noting that the school removed the 
accused student’s right to counsel, among other changes).  
 36. See, e.g., Brandeis University, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 607 (lowering standard to preponderance 
of the evidence for sexual misconduct and retained clear and convincing for other code 
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Harvard Law professors denounced the new sexual misconduct policy 
as “lack[ing] the most basic elements of fairness and due process” and 
called the process “overwhelmingly stacked against the accused.”37 
In the wake of this regulatory shift, a wave of male students found 
responsible in sexual misconduct adjudications at the campus level 
sued their schools with some success. These students alleged either or 
both of gender discrimination under Title IX38 and due process 
violations.39 Regardless of intent, OCR pitted the accused students’ due 
process rights against those of the victims, putting schools in a “double 
bind.”40 Schools either “c[a]me under public fire for not responding to 
allegations of sexual assault aggressively enough or they open[ed] 
themselves to Title IX simply by enforcing rules against perpetrators.”41 
After the 2016 election and change in administration, DOE 
withdrew the DCL42 and announced its intention to promulgate new 
rules specifying schools’ Title IX obligations.43 In its Proposed Rule, 
DOE established several “procedural safeguards” schools must 
integrate into their grievance procedures.44 These included: impartial 
decision makers, the accused’s right to written notice of the charges, 
equal ability to access and present evidence and witnesses, the 
requirement of a live hearing with cross-examination, and the option 
for schools to utilize a clear and convincing standard of proof.45 As of 
April 7, 2020, the comment period has closed and the Proposed Rule is 
 
violations); Wash. and Lee Univ., 2015 WL 4647996 at *9 (lowering standard to preponderance of 
the evidence for sexual misconduct rather and retained beyond a reasonable doubt for honor code 
violations). 
 37. Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 14, 2014), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassmentpolicy/ 
HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html. 
 38. E.g., Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2016) (alleging gender 
discrimination).  
 39. E.g., Austin v. Univ. of Or., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1217 (D. Or. 2016) (alleging both 
gender discrimination and due process violations). 
 40. See id. at 1226. 
 41. Id. at 1226–27. 
 42. Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 
to Colleague, (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-
201709.pdf. 
 43. Secretary Betsy DeVos, Secretary DeVos Prepared Remarks on Title IX Enforcement 
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/secretary-devos-prepared-remarks-title-ix-
enforcement. 
 44. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,474–75, 61,477 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to 
be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
 45. Id. at 61,471–72. 
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being finalized.46 Unsurprisingly, the Proposed Rule was met with 
resistance in the public debate, and many news outlets portrayed it as 
an assault on women’s rights.47 However, a more nuanced discussion is 
necessary as to the procedural protections afforded to accused 
students. 
II. DUE PROCESS 
As state institutions, public colleges must comport with due process. 
Although the Due Process Clause does not extend to actions by private 
actors, students at private colleges may also have some due process-
esque rights. Students at private colleges may benefit from a judicially 
formed right to basic fairness, and courts have referred to due process 
principles when evaluating the fundamental fairness of college sexual 
misconduct disciplinary procedures.48 Students may also have an 
implied state contract law right to procedural protections that schools 
voluntarily promise to provide its students in handbooks or other 
materials.49 
The Due Process right found in the Constitution protects against 
the “depriv[ation] of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law,”50 and is applicable to the federal government and state 
governments through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
respectively. To successfully state a due process claim, a student must 
have a sufficient property or liberty interest upon which the school 
infringed.51 Then, the reviewing court determines what process, if any, 
 
 46. Simone C. Chu & Iris M. Lewis, What Happens Next with Title IX: DeVos’s Proposed 
Rule, Explained, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/ 
2/27/title-ix-explainer/; Nicole Gaudiano, New Title IX Rule Ready to Drop, POLITICO (Apr. 1, 
2020), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-education/2020/04/01/new-title-ix-rule-read 
y-to-drop-despite-pleas-for-delay-786557. 
 47. E.g., Jennifer Medina & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, ‘An Attack on Students’ Rights’ 
Reactions to Betsy DeVos’s New Rules on Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/us/devos-college-sexual-assault.html; Dana Bolger & 
Alexandra Brodsky, Betsy DeVos’s Title IX Interpretation is an Attack on Sexual Assault 
Survivors, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/ 
wp/2017/09/08/betsy-devoss-title-ix-interpretation-is-an-attack-on-sexual-assault-survivors/.  
 48. See, e.g., Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 602 (D. Mass. 2016). 
 49. See, e.g., Doe v. Trs. Of Boston Coll., 892 F.3d. 67, 87 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposed under Massachusetts contract law applied in the 
context of school disciplinary proceedings); see also Ebert v. Yeshiva Univ., 780 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (noting that courts will review private university action as to whether the 
school followed its own policies and acted in good faith). 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XVIII. 
 51. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). In the context of campus sexual 
assault cases, suspensions and expulsions can implicate a protected property interest. See, e.g., 
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the Constitution requires using the three-part balancing test the 
Supreme Court established in Matthews v. Eldridge.52 This test 
balances: (1) the private interest of the accused student; (2) the interest 
of the college, including “fiscal and administrative burdens;” and (3) 
the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the accused student’s] interest 
through the procedures used, and the probative value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”53 Due process “is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and 
circumstances.”54 More serious deprivations of a protected interest 
require more demanding process.55 At a minimum, the Supreme Court 
has held that students in campus disciplinary proceedings are entitled 
to “some kind of notice and some kind of hearing.”56 Due process does 
not, however, entitle accused students to the full trial rights afforded to 
criminal defendants.57 Fundamentally, due process requires that the 
accused has a meaningful opportunity to be heard and defend him or 
herself.58 
In the context of college sexual misconduct cases, courts have 
recognized that both students accused of sexual misconduct and 
schools adjudicating such cases have compelling interests at stake. 
Charges of sexual assault “carry the potential for substantial public 
condemnation and disgrace”59 and they can affect long-term 
educational and employment prospects.60 Moreover, students have an 
interest in avoiding wrongful punishment and the consequential 
stigma.61 
 
Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2017) (suspension); Doe v. Northern Mich. 
Univ., 393 F.Supp.3d 683, 693 (W.D. Mich. 2019) (quoting Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d. at 399) 
(expulsion). Courts have found sufficient liberty interests rooted in reputational harm or the 
liberty to pursue a certain career. See, e.g., Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 661–63 (7th Cir. 
2019) (freedom to pursue a career in the Navy); Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d. at 399 (reputational 
harm). 
 52. E.g., Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 399 (citing Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334–35). 
 53. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.  
 54. Id. (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 386 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). 
 55. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (noting that expulsions and suspensions 
longer than the 10-day suspension at issue in this case “may require more formal procedures.”)  
 56. Id. at 579. 
 57. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong 
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). 
 59. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 607 (D. Mass. 2016). 
 60. E.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 582 (6th Cir. 2018); Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 
F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 61. Haidak v. Univ. Of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2019). 
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Schools have a strong interest in maintaining a safe educational 
environment, protecting their campuses from those who violate the 
schools’ codes of conduct or policies,62 and conserving finite 
administrative resources.”63 Because Title IX ultimately serves to 
eliminate sex discrimination in educational programs, the adjudication 
of campus sexual misconduct under Title IX requires that recipient 
schools consider the victims’ rights. Victims have a strong interest in 
continuing their education while avoiding re-victimization.64 Growing 
evidence illustrates the detrimental effects the adversarial system can 
have on victims, especially cross-examination at live hearings.65 Victims’ 
advocates suggest that trauma-informed procedures—those that take 
into account the effects of trauma from sexual offenses—can limit re-
victimization and protect victims’ mental and emotional well-being.66 
III. EVALUATION OF PROPOSED RULE 
Five overarching due process protections in the Proposed Rule will 
be evaluated: (1) reduction of presumptions and biases; (2) notice of 
the charges; (3) equal access and presentment rights with respect to 
evidence; (4) live hearing with cross-examination; and (5) the burden 
of proof. This section compares these five protections to the old 
guidance under the DCL, assesses the degree to which the Proposed 
Rule comports with due process, and proposes modifications to the 
Proposed Rule when necessary to ensure sufficient protections for the 
victims. 
 
 62. E.g., id. 
 63. E.g., Plummer, 860 F.3d at 774–75; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (“[F]urther 
formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only 
make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the 
teaching process.”). 
 64. See Cecilia Mengo & Beverly M. Black, Violence Victimization on a College Campus: 
Impact on GPA and Student Dropout, 18(2) J. C. STUDENT RETENTION: RES., THEORY, & PRAC. 
234, 242–43 (2015), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1521025115584750 (finding that 
compared to college students who experience physical/verbal victimization, students who 
experience sexual victimization drop out of school and see their GPAs drop more frequently); 
Audrey Chu, I Dropped Out of College Because I Couldn’t Bear to See My Rapist on Campus, 
VICE (Sept. 26, 2017), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/qvjzpd/i-dropped-out-of-college-
because-i-couldnt-bear-to-see-myrapist-on-campus. 
 65. Mary Fan, Adversarial Justice’s Casualties: Defending Victim-Witness Protection, 55 B.C. 
L. REV. 775, 775 (2014). 
 66. The Importance of Understanding Trauma-Informed Care and Self-Care for Victim 
Service Providers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 30, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ 
ovw/blog/importance-understanding-trauma-informed-care-and-self-care-victim-service-
providers. 
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A. Presumptions and Biases 
The Proposed Rule includes a number of requirements to reduce 
biases. First, colleges must impose a presumption of non-responsibility 
“until a determination regarding responsibility is made.”67 Second, 
“credibility determinations may not be based on a person’s status as a 
complainant, respondent, or witness.”68 A decision maker cannot “have 
a conflict of interest or bias for or against complainants or respondents 
generally or an individual complainant or respondent” and training 
materials cannot “rely on sex stereotypes.”69 The DCL guidance 
required that conflicts of interests be disclosed, with no discussion of 
potential biases.70 Third, the Proposed Rule requires colleges to 
separate the decision maker from the investigator.71 This eliminates the 
“single-investigator model” implicitly permitted under the DCL 
guidance.72 Under this model, one person serves as both the 
investigator, who gathers evidence, and the decision maker, who 
evaluates the evidence and renders a decision.73 Each of the factors 
described above are addressed in turn. 
1. Presumption of Non-Responsibility 
While the DCL guidance facially required impartiality,74 in reality 
schools “institutionaliz[ed] a presumption of guilt in sexual assault 
cases.”75 For example, Stanford University’s training materials included 
 
 67. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,472 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified 
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
 68. Id.  
 69. See id. at 61,473 (“[D]ecision-maker [may] not have a conflict of interest or bias for or 
against complainants or respondents generally or an individual complainant or respondent[.]”).  
 70. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 12. 
 71. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61, 477 
 72. See Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra note 25, at 11–12 
(imposing no requirements on who conducts the investigation, and noting that the Title IX 
Coordinator can serve as both the investigator and the decision maker, barring any conflicts of 
interest).  
 73. ABA Criminal Justice Section Council, ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on 
College Due Process Rights and Victim Protections: Recommendations for Colleges and 
Universities in Resolving Allegations of Campus Sexual Misconduct, AM. BAR ASS’N 3 (June 
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/2017/ABA-
Due-Process-Task-Force-Recommendations-and-Report.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 74. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 12 (“[P]rocesses cannot be equitable unless they 
are impartial.”). 
 75. Peter Perkowaitz, College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of Male Guilt, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 20, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405311190359690457 
6516232905230642.  
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an excerpt from a book titled: “Why Did He Do That? Inside the Minds 
of Angry and Controlling Men.”76 This resource instructed: “Everyone 
should be very very cautious in accepting a man’s claim that he has 
been wrongly accused.”77 Another document in Stanford’s training 
materials on how to identify an abuser indicates that “[a]ct[ing] 
persuasive and logical” is indicative of an abuser.78 An argument in 
favor of the non-responsibility presumption rests on the de facto 
presumption of guilt imposed by many schools under the DCL. In 2017, 
a Federal Court of Appeals judge remarked that OCR “procedures 
prescribed for adjudication of sexual misconduct are heavily weighted 
in favor of finding guilt.”79 
However, the presumption of non-responsibility is not required 
under due process principles and may unfairly tilt the scales in the favor 
of the accused. A presumption of non-responsibility should be viewed 
as distinct from the presumption of innocence afforded to criminal 
defendants.80 For one, criminal defendants retain this presumption until 
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a higher burden not applied 
in campus disciplinary procedures.81 Campus sexual assault 
adjudications will also never result in incarceration or loss of life. 
Further, courts have routinely held that students in campus disciplinary 
procedures are not entitled to the full trial rights enjoyed by criminal 
defendants.82 In its public comment in response to the proposed rule, 
the American Civil Liberties Union noted that the presumption of non-
responsibility is unnecessary because under either a preponderance of 
 
 76. Mike Armstrong, Op-Ed: A Thumb on the Scale of Justice, STAN. DAILY (Apr. 29, 2011), 
https://www.stanforddaily.com/2011/04/29/op-ed-a-thumb-on-the-scale-of-justice/. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 779 (5th Cir. 2017) (Jones, J., dissenting). 
 80. See American Civil Liberties Union, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 
“Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal 
Financial Assistance” n. 71 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-comments-title-ix-
proposed-rule [hereinafter “ACLU Comment Letter”] (clarifying that the presumption of 
responsibility does not appear in any other legal context and is not to be confused with the 
presumption of innocence).  
 81. Democratic Attorneys General, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule “Nondiscrimination 
on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance” 
35 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2019/01/2019-01-31-
Title-IX-Comments-Final.pdf [hereinafter “Attorneys General Comment Letter”].  
 82. E.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 583 (6th Cir. 2018) (personally confront accuser or 
witnesses); Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio., 418 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (rules of criminal 
procedure and open hearings); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 665 (11th Cir. 1987) (rules of 
evidence); Henson v. Honor Committee of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); 
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. Of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961) (“a full-dress judicial hearing”). 
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the evidence or clear and convincing standard, the respondent prevails 
if “the evidence is in equipoise.”83 Further, a presumption akin to a 
presumption of innocence perpetuates rape myths, namely that women 
often lie about sexual assault.84 A presumption of non-responsibility is 
also itself a form of bias, and imposing this presumption seemingly cuts 
against one of the primary purposes of the Proposed Rule—to 
eliminate biases.85 
2.  Impartial Decision Makers 
Due process requires an impartial adjudication process, which 
inherently includes an unbiased decision maker.86 Furthermore, the due 
process right of “some kind of hearing” afforded to students in campus 
disciplinary procedures87 would be meaningless if the decision maker 
“came to the hearing having predetermined [the accused’s] guilt.”88 
The Proposed Rule generally strengthens the impartiality of the 
decision maker by disallowing conflicts of interests and biases and 
excluding the consideration of status as a victim or accused from 
credibility determinations.89 An impartial tribunal is an essential 
feature of due process,90 and the same holds true in the campus 
 
 83. ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 80. 
 84. See National Crime Victim Bar Association, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 
“Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal 
Financial Assistance” 11 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018-
OCR-0064-102838 [hereinafter “NCVBA Comment Letter”]. 
 85. See Secretary DeVos: Proposed Title IX Rule Provides Clarity For All Schools, Support 
for Survivors, and Due Process Rights for All, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Nov. 16, 2018) (stating 
DOE’s goal with the proposed regulation was to ensure Title IX proceeding become more 
“transparent, consistent and reliable” and ensuring Title IX “protects all students.”). 
 86. Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x. 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 
U.S. 35, 47 (1975)) (“It is unquestioned that a fundamental due-process requirement is an 
impartial and unbiased adjudicator,”). See also Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 608 
(D. Mass. 2016) (“[O]ne of the most basic components of fairness is an unbiased and neutral fact-
finder.”).  
 87. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1979). 
 88. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 
827 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2016)) (reversing the dismissal of a § 1983 due process claim on a 
12(b)(6) motion and holding that the student adequately pled that he was deprived due process, 
in part because two of the three members of the hearing panel rendered a decision without 
reviewing the investigatory report, suggesting that they determined his guilt based solely on the 
accusations and not the evidence).  
 89. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,462, 61,472.  
 90. E.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) (“As this Court repeatedly has 
recognized, due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or 
quasi-judicial capacities.”). 
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disciplinary context.91 The Proposed Rule makes clear that favoring or 
disfavoring either party can generate liability for sex discrimination.92 
Although the DCL purported to instill impartiality in decision 
makers,93 these explicit requirements are necessary in light of the 
reality of the DCL’s effect. The financial pressure exerted by OCR and 
negative media attention have contributed to due process violations. 
For example, the District of Colorado found it plausible that a Title IX 
coordinator and an investigator were biased because they were “under 
scrutiny due to [an] OCR investigation and related public pressure,” 
which in turn contributed to a plausible due process violation.94 
Another federal court found a plausible due process claim rooted in 
impartiality in part because, at the hearing, the Title IX coordinator and 
lead investigator gave “the appearance of support for [the 
complainant].”95 
Moreover, male students lacking viable due process claims have 
successfully pleaded claims of gender bias under Title IX. Courts have 
found sufficient allegations of gender bias based on sex stereotypes and 
generalizations,96 efforts to quell public criticism, and attempts to shield 
from financial repercussions by OCR.97 For example in Doe v. 
Columbia University, the Second Circuit found that a plaintiff 
sufficiently alleged that his decision makers “were all motivated . . . by 
pro-female, anti-male bias,” at least partially to refute mounting 
campus and public criticism “that Columbia was turning a blind eye to 
female students’ charge of sexual assaults by male students.”98 With 
respect to financial pressures, the Seventh Circuit noted that OCR 
opening two investigations into a school rendered “the pressure on the 
university to demonstrate compliance . . . far from abstract.”99 Similarly, 
 
 91. E.g., Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 601 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding students entitled to 
presumption of impartiality in disciplinary action); Park v. Temple Univ., 757 F. App’x. 102, 106 
(3d Cir. 2018). 
 92. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,473. 
 93. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 12 (highlighting procedural flaws and 
shortcoming in OCR policy). 
 94. Norris v. Univ. of Colorado, Boulder, 362 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1007, 1021 (D. Colo. 2019). 
 95. Gischel v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 302 F. Supp. 3d 961, 978–79 (S.D. Ohio 2018). 
 96. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 608 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding “reason to 
believe the Special Examiner decided [a male student’s] guilt to a substantial degree on unfair 
generalizations, stereotypes, or logical fallacies”). 
 97. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2016).  
 98. Id. at 57.  
 99. See Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 669 (7th Cir. 2019). The court went on to note 
that evidence of various institutional pressures and the DCL in and of itself does not “get [a 
plaintiff] over the plausibility line.” Id. at 669.   
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the First100 and Sixth101 Circuits have suggested that financial pressures 
exerted by OCR could support a plausible inference of gender bias, if 
sufficiently pleaded. 
3. Single-Investigator Model 
The single-investigator model is appropriately eliminated under the 
Proposed Rule.102 Under this model, used by many schools under the 
DCL guidance, the person that gathers the evidence also makes factual 
findings about that evidence. One court described the single 
investigator as “simultaneously the investigator, the prosecutor, and 
the judge who determines guilt.”103 Although several federal circuit 
courts have found that a decision maker assuming multiple roles in the 
adjudicatory process is not a per se violation of due process, it can give 
rise to a due process violation based in part on an impartial tribunal.104 
Courts and legal professionals have denounced this model as 
inherently susceptible to biases.105 Regardless of good intentions, any 
individual can have implicit biases, make mistakes, or reach premature 
conclusions.106 Having a neutral party evaluate the evidence and reach 
a determination reduces the risk of erroneous outcomes.107 
 
 100. See Doe v. Tr. of Bos. Coll., 892 F.3d 67, 92–93 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding an allegation of 
gender bias motivated by the DCL meritless because the plaintiff did not plead facts explaining 
how it affected his specific adjudication). 
 101. Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 594 (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 
(6th Cir. 2018). 
 102. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,477 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified 
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
 103. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 579 (D. Mass. 2016). But cf. Purdue Univ., 
928 F.3d at 664 (noting that the single-investigator model does not necessarily render the process 
unfair, but rather a plaintiff must rebut a presumption of impartiality and show prejudice by the 
single-investigator). 
 104. E.g., Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 567 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 105. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 606 (noting that the dangers of combining these 
functions in one person are “obvious”); ABA Criminal Justice Section Council, ABA Criminal 
Justice Section Task Force on College Due Process Rights and Victim Protections: 
Recommendations for Colleges and Universities in Resolving Allegations of Campus Sexual 
Misconduct, AM. BAR ASS’N 3 (June 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/criminaljustice/2017/ABA-Due-Process-Task-Force-Recommendations-and-
Report.authcheckdam.pdf (reporting that this model “carries inherent structural fairness risks”). 
 106. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 606. 
 107. Id.  
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B. Notice 
The DCL guidance contained no explicit requirement that students 
accused of sexual misconduct be notified of the charges against them.108 
The Proposed Rule requires notice of (1) the alleged violations of the 
college’s code of conduct and (2) sufficient details regarding the 
allegations, including the identities of the parties involved, the date, 
time, and location of the alleged incident.109 The Proposed Rule also 
requires schools to inform accused students of their right to request and 
inspect evidence.110 Further, it imposes on schools a continuing duty to 
supplement the initial notice with additional allegations the school 
later decides to investigate.111 
Although courts vary in their formulation of what notice is due in 
student misconduct proceedings, it is generally agreed that notice 
should sufficiently ensure the accused student a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.112 For notice to be meaningful, it must include 
some factual basis of the allegations.113 As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, the degree of formality required corresponds to the 
seriousness of the deprivation.114 The Fifth Circuit, for example, has 
held that when students face expulsion, notice “should contain a 
statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would 
justify expulsion.”115 
Both the initial notice requirement and the duty to supplement are 
necessary due process protections. Under Matthews balancing, the 
burden on the school to notify the accused of the charges when the 
 
 108. See generally Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24 (excluding any requirement of notice 
to the alleged perpetrator); Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra note 
25 (same).  
 109. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,474 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified 
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.2d 629, 638 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) 
(“Notice satisfies due process if the student ‘had sufficient notice of the charges against him and 
a meaningful opportunity to prepare for the hearing.’”); see also Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.3d 
655, 661 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[Notice must be] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections.”).  
 113. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of So. Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 221, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).  
 114. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (“[W]e have addressed ourselves solely to 
the short suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder 
of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.”). 
 115. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d. 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961) (emphasis added). 
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school has that information is low.116 Further, the risk of erroneous 
outcome is high when one party—the school—has complete 
information, while the other party—the accused—lacks even the basic 
facts surrounding an investigation.117 In Doe v. Brandeis University, 
Brandeis failed to give notice to the student accused of sexual assault 
of the factual basis for the charge, despite his repeated requests.118 The 
school only gave him what the court described as a “vaguely worded 
[two-sentence] allegation.”119 Through the course of the investigation, 
he was “forced to speculate.”120 Crucially, the decision maker found the 
victim to be more credible.121 The court found that lack of notice 
adversely affected the accused’s ability to respond to the allegations.122 
The accused’s inconsistent recollection of events, according to the 
court, “is exactly what one would expect where one party is fully 
informed . . . and the other party remains ignorant.”123 
The duty to supplement is similarly necessary because it violates 
due process for a student to be punished for offenses of which he was 
unaware. Without notice of the charge, the student cannot mount a 
meaningful defense.124 For example, the Eastern District of Virginia 
found a due process violation where an accused student was given 
notice of only one incident on one specific date, but was expelled in 
part based on incidents occurring on different dates.125 At the hearing, 
the accused lacked notice of the charges against him and this 
insufficient notice was inexorably tied to the adequacy of his 
opportunity to be heard.126 It is further unfair for an accused student to 
be punished for an offense of which he is unaware, based on testimony 
given or evidence presented to defend against a different offense.127 
 
 116. See Doe v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602, 618 (E.D. 
Va. 2016) (noting that the school only notified the student of an incident occurring on one date 
but had knowledge of and expelled him based on different incidents that occurring on different 
dates). 
 117. See Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 603 (D. Mass. 2016) (noting how the 
respondent was unable to mount a defense). 
 118. Id. at 583. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 583, 603. 
 121. Id. at 603. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. See, e.g., Doe v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602, 618 
(E.D. Va. 2016). 
 125. Id. at 616–18. 
 126. Id. at 616–17. 
 127. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of So. Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 221, 242 (Cal. App. 2016) (noting 
that “a disciplinary penalty based on testimony given while defending against a different charge 
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From the victim’s perspective, however, the more detailed the 
notice, the greater the potential confidentiality concerns and risk of 
retaliation. A group of Attorneys General have suggested that 
requiring disclosure of the complainant’s name and detailed factual 
allegations could result in leaks or be sent to third parties, and 
complainants might want to withhold their name or other confidential 
information.128 However, to prepare a meaningful response, students 
facing disciplinary sanctions must know the name of the 
complainant.129 The 2001 OCR guidance recognized this. It instructed 
that if a complainant requested his or her name be withheld, the 
accused student’s response to the charges would be limited, and “OCR 
would not expect a disciplinary action against” the accused, but the 
school’s response could include supportive measures for the 
complainant.130 The Proposed Rule should include a confidentiality 
carve-out allowing complainants to withhold their name, provided that 
the accused student is not subject to disciplinary measures as a result. 
This enables the complainant to seek supportive measures, such as 
rescheduling classes or new living arrangements, while ensuring the 
scope of potential penalties respondents face is proportional. The 
Proposed Rule should also do more to address retaliation concerns.131 
For example, the notice should specifically apprise both parties that 
retaliating against someone for complaining of sex discrimination is 
itself a form of sex discrimination, and barred under Title IX.132 These 
 
smacks of unfairness” when a student being investigated for one charge was disciplined in part 
based on statements he gave related to another charge of which he was unaware); cf. In re Ruffalo, 
390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (“These [attorney disbarment proceedings] are adversary proceedings of 
a quasi-criminal nature. The charge must be known before the proceedings commence. They 
become a trap when, after they are underway, the charges are amended on the basis of testimony 
of the accused. He can then be given no opportunity to expunge the earlier statements and start 
afresh.”). 
 128. Attorneys General Comment Letter, supra note 81, at 38–39. 
 129. See Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that a 
student facing disciplinary measures should be given the name of the witnesses testifying against 
him and a report on the facts to which they will testify). 
 130. 2001 Guidance, supra note 22, at 17. 
 131. See ABA Criminal Justice Section Council, ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on 
College Due Process Rights and Victim Protections: Recommendations for Colleges and 
Universities in Resolving Allegations of Campus Sexual Misconduct, AM. BAR ASS’N 2 (June 
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/2017/ABA-
Due-Process-Task-Force-Recommendations-and-Report.authcheckdam.pdf (recommending 
that the Proposed Rule include provisions to prevent retaliation and to require communication 
of such provisions to the parties during the investigatory and adjudicatory processes). 
 132. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173–74 (2005); see generally Letter 
from Seth M. Galanter, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights to Colleagues (Apr. 24, 2013), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201304.html#ftn3. 
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modifications are necessary to protect victims from invasions of privacy 
and retaliation. 
C. Accessing and Presenting Evidence 
The Proposed Rule requires that parties have equal access to and 
opportunities to present evidence and witnesses.133 While the DCL 
facially required equal rights in this respect,134 it implicitly encouraged 
schools to treat complainants more favorably.135 For example, after a 
respondent denied the allegations brought against him, Purdue 
University withheld all the evidence it used to adjudicate his case.136 In 
a similar case, The University of Southern California refused to provide 
a respondent with the evidence the school had supporting the 
allegations unless the respondent “actively sought it through a written 
request.”137 In both cases, the respective courts found due process 
violations.138 The Proposed Rule appropriately specifies universities’ 
obligations with respect to gathering and presenting evidence. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause “at least” 
requires that respondents in campus misconduct adjudications receive 
“an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an 
opportunity to present his side of the story.”139 Some courts have gone 
further. For example, the Fifth and Fourth Circuits support the 
following minimum procedures schools must afford students in 
disciplinary hearings: access to the names of witnesses and some 
information on the facts to which they will testify, the opportunity to 
 
 133. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,498 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified 
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (“Provide equal opportunity for the parties to present witnesses and other 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence . . . . Provide both parties an equal opportunity to inspect 
and review any evidence obtained as part of the investigation that is directly related to the 
allegations raised in a formal complaint, including the evidence upon which the recipient does not 
intend to rely in reaching a determination regarding responsibility, so that each party can 
meaningfully respond to the evidence prior to conclusion of the investigation . . . . Create an 
investigative report [and] . . . provide a copy of the report to the parties for their review and 
written response . . . .”). 
 134. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 11(emphasis added) (“[P]arties must have 
an equal opportunity to present relevant witnesses and other evidence.”). 
 135. Elizabeth Bartholet, et al., Fairness for All Students Under Title IX, HARV. UNIV. DASH 
REPOSITORY 2 (Aug. 21, 2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33789434/Fairness 
%20for%20All%20Students.pdf (“Though OCR did not require schools to treat accused students 
unfairly in the investigation and adjudication process, its tactics put pressure on them to stack the 
system so as to favor the alleged victims.”). 
 136. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 663 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 137. Doe v. Univ. of So. Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 221, 248 (Cal. App. 2016). 
 138. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 663; Univ. of So. Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th at 246. 
 139. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). 
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defend the charges either orally or through written affidavits of 
witnesses, and access to a report of the decision maker’s findings.140 The 
Seventh Circuit has held that “withholding the evidence on which [the 
school] relied in adjudicating . . . guilt [is] itself sufficient to render the 
process fundamentally unfair.”141 
Under the DCL guidance, schools also treated complainants and 
respondents dissimilarly with respect to which witnesses they 
interviewed, what evidence they investigated, and what materials they 
provided to the parties. Brandeis University, for example, refused to 
provide the respondent with a copy of the investigatory report on which 
he was found responsible until after both his adjudication and appeal 
ended.142 Columbia University refused to interview any of the 
witnesses the respondent identified, while interviewing at least one of 
complainant’s witnesses.143 The University of Southern California gave 
only the complainant copies of the investigatory notes taken on each 
witness.144 These examples are inconsistent with due process. Failure to 
investigate impeachment evidence when it is brought to the school’s 
attention can be “fundamentally unfair” to the party raising that 
evidence.145 Sexual assault cases often hinge on credibility, and thus 
impeachment evidence may be particularly important with respect to 
due process.146 Moreover, the Second Circuit found that declining to 
interview witnesses the respondent identified as having favorable 
information contributed to a plausible allegation of gender bias under 
Title IX.147 
The Proposed Rule also broadens the scope of the investigatory 
evidence parties can obtain. This change is generally positive but lacks 
necessary carve-outs. The Proposed Rule enables both parties to access 
evidence obtained during the investigation that “is directly related to 
the allegations raised in the formal complaint”148 as opposed to 
 
 140. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961); see also Henson v. 
Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983) (supporting the application of the 
“minimum due process requirements for disciplinary hearings” as summarized by Dixon). 
 141. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 663. 
 142. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 585 (D. Mass. 2016). 
 143. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 n.10 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 144. Doe v. Univ. of So. Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 221, 244 (Cal. App. 2016). 
 145. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 664. 
 146. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 147. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 56. 
 148. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,475 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified 
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
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“information that will be used at the hearing[,]” which the DCL 
required.149 Some have argued that the broader language in the 
Proposed Rule invites parties to seek irrelevant or confidential 
information. However, limiting disclosure to information used at the 
hearing is problematic because relevance has been used to exclude 
evidence potentially favorable to the accused, including impeachment 
evidence. Schools have used lack of relevance to avoid investigating 
impeachment or otherwise favorable evidence proposed by the 
respondent. For example, Columbia University declined to interview 
the respondent’s witnesses because the decision maker claimed it was 
irrelevant.150 Similarly, Washington and Lee University declined to 
interview some of the respondent’s witnesses, claiming that they 
already had the facts they needed.151 Including a broad exception for 
irrelevance could enable schools to selectively investigate under the 
guise of relevance or lack of necessity. However, the Proposed Rule 
should allow for redaction of sensitive information, such as medical 
information, and should protect information covered under privileges 
such as attorney-client and physician-patient.152 These exceptions 
would protect complainants’ conversations with medical professionals, 
and reduce the risk of unnecessary disclosure of sensitive information. 
D. Cross-Examination at a Live Hearing 
The Proposed Rule requires cross-examination at a live hearing.153 
Instead of traditional cross-examination, the Proposed Rule should 
utilize a third-party questioner model of cross-examination. This model 
can achive the primary benefit of cross-examination—assessing 
credibility—in a manner that is less adversarial and better suited to the 
educational context in which the adjudications take place. Further, 
carve-outs are necessary for specific situations in which any form of 
cross-examination would have little probative value. 
The requirement of cross-examination represents a sharp departure 
from the DCL, and is one of the most contentious aspects of the 
Proposed Rule.154 The Proposed Rule also bars questions about the 
 
 149. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 11. 
 150. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at n.10. 
 151. Doe v. Wash. and Lee Univ., No. 6: 14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *4 (Aug. 5, 2015). 
 152. See ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 80, at 30; Attorneys General Comment Letter, 
supra note 81, at 42–43. 
 153. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,474. 
 154. E.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Keep Cross-Examination Out Of College Sexual-Assault 
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complainant’s sexual history unless the evidence is offered to prove 
someone other than the respondent committed the offense or to prove 
consent,155 otherwise known as a “rape shield.”156 Either party can 
request that the cross-examination occur with the parties in separate 
rooms using live-stream technology to allow the decision maker to view 
the testimony in real-time.157 The Proposed Rule also prohibits 
respondents from conducting cross-examination themselves; rather, the 
respondent’s advisor or a school-appointed advisor must do so.158 The 
DCL did not require live hearings and strongly discouraged cross-
examination.159 
The Supreme Court has never ruled on what due process requires 
with respect to cross-examination in post-secondary disciplinary 
procedures. In other contexts, it has declared that “cross-examination 
has always been considered a most effective way to ascertain truth,”160 
and crucially allows for the assessment of demeanor and credibility.161 
Circuit courts have noted that cross-examination is “most critical when 
the issue is the credibility of the accuser.”162 Credibility disputes are 
paradigmatic of sexual misconduct cases. Most student-on-student 
sexual misconduct issues amount to a he-said-she-said dispute: the 
parties assert competing claims supported by little, if any, corroborating 
evidence, and the decision maker must determine which account is 
more credible.163 Some courts have thus held that in campus sexual 
misconduct cases where credibility is at issue, due process requires a 
hearing with cross-examination.164 Further, the Sixth Circuit deemed 
 
Cases, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 10 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Keep-Cross-
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Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,475. 
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 157. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,475. 
 158. Id. at 61,474–75. 
 159. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 11–12. 
 160. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981). 
 161. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990). 
 162. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 401 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe v. Brandeis 
177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 605 (D. Mass. 2016)). 
 163. ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 80, at 25. 
 164. Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d. 56, 69 (1st Cir. 2019); Doe v. Baum, 903 
F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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live questioning necessary and written statements insufficient because 
adversarial questioning is essential to assessing credibility.165 
Although cross-examination renders hearing outcomes more 
reliable,166 administering traditional cross-examination in all sexual 
misconduct adjudications imposes potentially massive administrative 
and financial burdens on universities, and also risks re-traumatizing 
complainants. Schools simply lack the resources to appropriately 
administer the type of cross-examination envisioned by the Proposed 
Rule. No matter how well-intentioned, the staff typically overseeing 
disciplinary hearings are not judges or mediators and generally lack 
legal training.167 The costs of retaining appropriate staff or training 
existing staff could be prohibitive,168 especially since the Proposed Rule 
requires schools to appoint advisors for students upon request.169 The 
American Council on Education has argued that “highly legalistic, 
court-like processes” are at odds with school’s core “educational 
missions.”170 Schools also have a strong interest in encouraging students 
to report sexual misconduct and avoid the infliction of additional, 
unnecessary harm to those that come forward.171 Mandatory cross-
examination could frustrate those interests. Undergoing cross-
examination by an advisor of the respondent’s choice potentially 
subjects the complainant to traumatization and other negative effects 
linked to cross-examination.172 The prospect of being cross-examined 
at a live hearing might also discourage students, both complainants and 
witnesses, from participating.173 Also, the decision maker is barred from 
 
 165. Baum, 903 F.3d at 582–83. 
 166. E.g., Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 402. 
 167. International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, Comment 
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Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance” 8 (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.iaclea.org/ 
assets/uploads/pdfs/Title_IX_IACLEA_Response_Comments.pdf. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,462, 61,474–75 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be 
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).  
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Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance” 8 (Jan. 20, 
2019), https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-to-Education-Department-on-Proposed-
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 171. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 583 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 172. See NCVBA Comment Letter, supra note 84, at 12–13 (noting that the respondent’s 
advisor of choice will often be an attorney who “is prepared to grill the survivor about the 
traumatic details of the assault, or possibly an angry parent or a close friend” and the “adversarial 
and contentious nature of cross-examination risks further unnecessary trauma . . . .”). 
 173. E.g., id. at 13.  
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considering any out-of-hearing statements made by parties or 
witnesses who refuse to submit to cross-examination.174 Thus, if parties 
do not submit to cross-examination, critical evidence might be barred 
from consideration. 
However, a balance can be struck to achieve the primary benefit of 
assessing credibility within the administrative capabilities of most 
schools while also reducing the risk of further harm to victims. Many 
schools have adopted, and courts have upheld as constitutionally 
sound, a process by which a third-party questioner facilitates an 
adversarial exchange using questions submitted by both parties.175 A 
hearing panel or decision maker ultimately decides which questions to 
ask and poses the questions. The parties can be located in different 
rooms, and the third-party poses questions each side proposed to ask 
the other, allowing the decision maker to assess the demeanor and 
truthfulness of responses. Through the “iterative process” of 
questioning, the complainant is informed by the answers given by the 
respondent in real time, and vice versa.176 In upholding a similar 
process, the First Circuit noted that traditional cross-examination 
would not “increase the probative value of hearings or decrease the 
risk of erroneous deprivation of due process.”177 The Seventh Circuit 
upheld a version of this approach even where the parties were barred 
from submitting follow-up questions.178 Many schools currently utilize 
a version of this method,179 and a group of Democratic Attorneys 
General supports its implementation.180 
Moreover, irrespective of the format, live cross-examination may 
not be necessary in all sexual misconduct cases. Although most cases 
turn on testimonial evidence, not all do. For example, where video and 
 
 174. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,475. 
 175. E.g., Assessing Betsy DeVos’s Proposed Rules on Title IX and Sexual Assault, NEW 
YORKER (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/assessing-betsy-devos-
proposed-rules-on-title-ix-and-sexual-assault. 
 176. Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 70 (1st Cir. 2019) (upholding the 
constitutionality of having a neutral board pose questions submitted by both sides, alternating 
between the two sides, and examining each side three times, because the hearing was “reasonably 
calculated to get at the truth” and “reasonably calculated to expose any relevant flaws” in the 
complainant’s account). 
 177. Id. (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) (quotation marks omitted).  
 178. Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x. 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 179. E.g., Assessing Betsy DeVos’s Proposed Rules on Title IX and Sexual Assault, NEW 
YORKER (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/assessing-betsy-devos-
proposed-rules-on-title-ix-and-sexual-assault (noting that Harvard uses a version of this method). 
 180. Attorneys General Comment Letter, supra note 81, at 41. 
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photo evidence of the alleged sexual assault served as the primary 
evidence and the complainant’s credibility was not at issue, the Fifth 
Circuit found that limiting cross-examination to written questions did 
not violate the accused’s due process.181 Further, when a respondent 
admits to the allegations, cross-examination may be wholly 
unnecessary: a confession eliminates the need to evaluate the 
demeanor or memory of the complainant or witness.182 Live cross-
examination in these two circumstances would have little to no 
probative value and impose undue burdens on schools and 
complainants. The Supreme Court has described the application of due 
process as an “intensely practical matter” and has also noted that “[the] 
very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures 
universally applicable to every imaginable situation.”183 As such, the 
Proposed Rule should exempt from live cross-examination cases 
involving confessions and video evidence, or at least provide a 
mechanism by which parties can petition the decision maker for 
exemptions based on the circumstances. 
E. Burden of Proof 
The burden of proof required for sexual misconduct adjudications 
represents another controversial change. The DCL prescribed the 
preponderance of the evidence standard,184 while the Proposed Rule 
allows schools to choose between preponderance of the evidence or the 
higher standard of clear and convincing.185 If schools choose 
preponderance of the evidence for sexual-related violations, they must 
uniformly apply that standard to non-sexual violations carrying the 
same maximum sanction.186 Ultimately, the higher burden of proof is 
unnecessary if schools comply with the other procedural protections in 
the Proposed Rule. 
 
 181. Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 775–76 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 182. See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 641 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plaintiff 
who admitted to a felony drug offense was not denied due process when his school disallowed 
him from cross-examining his arresting officer during his disciplinary hearing, and subsequently 
expelled him). 
 183. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 895 (1961)) (second alteration in original). 
 184. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 10–11. 
 185. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,477 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified 
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 186. Id.  
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Proponents of preponderance of the evidence lean on the nature of 
Title IX. For one, Title IX is a civil rights statute and preponderance of 
the evidence is used in civil rights litigation, including other suits under 
Title IX.187 This standard is more consistent with the “equitable” 
procedures required under current DOE regulations implementing 
Title IX.188 OCR itself uses preponderance of the evidence when it 
resolves issues of discrimination under Title IX.189 It also makes logical 
sense to treat parties equitably “where there is no ex ante reason to 
favor one side over the other.”190 These adjudications are also not 
criminal proceedings and students never face incarceration, which also 
supports the lack of necessity for a heightened standard. 
Conversely, proponents of the clear and convincing standard focus 
on the nature of the proceedings at issue. The Supreme Court has held 
that the preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate in a 
“typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private 
parties;” whereas, clear and convincing can be used in civil cases 
involving “allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal 
wrongdoing by the defendant” where the interests at stake are more 
substantial than money.191 The Court has further recognized that clear 
and convincing may be especially beneficial when someone’s 
reputation is at stake, and it has used this higher standard “to protect 
particularly important individual interests in various civil cases.”192 
Moreover, parties in civil rights litigation are afforded a vast array of 
procedural protections not available to respondents in campus 
misconduct proceedings, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and live hearings over which a judge presides.193 
Respondents in sexual misconduct adjudications have a compelling 
interest in safeguarding their reputation, especially in light of the 
collateral consequences that accompany a finding of responsibility. The 
Supreme Court has noted that due process is implicated when “a 
person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity” is in question.194 
Disclosure of sexual misconduct could foreclose further educational or 
 
 187. See ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 80, at 22.  
 188. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (2018).  
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employment opportunities.195 For example, the respondent in Doe v. 
Brandeis had a permanent notation of “serious sexual transgressions” 
on his educational record.196 Reputational injuries in campus sexual 
misconduct cases are comparable to those that follow a criminal 
conviction for similar conduct, and the stigma associated with sex 
offenses could be unduly harsh for someone who was never criminally 
convicted.197 A finding of responsibility can be life-altering. 
Schools also have a strong interest in maintaining safe and 
productive learning environments, which includes supporting victims 
and ensuring all students perceive the process as fair. A higher standard 
of proof, especially coupled with the presumption of non-responsibility, 
could be interpreted as swinging the pendulum in the opposite 
direction of the DCL suggesting favoritism toward the accused. 
Avoiding even the appearance of bias is in the school’s best interest. 
Further, allowing schools to use the “clear and convincing” standard for 
sexual misconduct and the preponderance of the evidence standard for 
other types of misconduct suggests that complainants in sexual 
misconduct should be viewed with enhanced scrutiny. This may 
perpetuate harmful stereotypes about rape and sexual assault victims, 
namely that they should not be trusted.198 In fact, research suggests that 
false accusations are rare.199 
Ultimately, respondents have a particularly compelling private 
interest, but the probative value of the higher standard is likely 
minimal, given the other procedural protections in place under the 
Proposed Rule. Courts have been particularly critical of schools’ 
utilization of preponderance of the evidence when other key 
procedural protections were lacking. For example, the court in Brandeis 
University noted that the lower standard was concerning in light of the 
school’s deliberate elimination of other procedural protections.200 
Former federal judge Nancy Gertner has also described Harvard’s 
regime as “the worst of both worlds, the lowest standard of proof, 
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coupled with the least protective procedures.”201 Preponderance of the 
evidence should suffice, provided that schools comply with other 
previously-discussed aspects of the Proposed Rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The procedural protections afforded by the Proposed Rule are well 
calculated to reduce the erroneous findings of responsibility 
perpetuated by the DCL. Basic due process rights must be afforded 
before punishment is imposed, and courts are increasingly finding 
sufficiently pleaded allegations of due process violations in campus 
sexual assault adjudications. Ultimately, an equitable process benefits 
both the respondents and the complainants, who have an interest not 
only in avoiding challenges to their own adjudications but also in the 
public perception of campus sexual assault and its victims. As Judge 
Nancy Gertner has stated, “[i]t takes only a few celebrated false 
accusations of rape to turn the clock back.”202 
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